This article investigates how the use of Islamic misinterpretations may contribute to the justification and normalization of OGBV in Sudan. By Thuraya Salih.
Introduction
The December revolution in Sudan showcased the transformative power of digital platforms. Social media, particularly X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook became vital tools for organizing protests and mobilizing citizens. This reflects a broader trend where generations increasingly utilize online spaces to challenge societal norms, advocate for change, and even drive political revolutions. However, while offering immense potential for positive change, these digital spaces also reflect negative local social structures, which manifests in online gender-based violence (OGBV).
To better understand the extent to which social media platforms influence the spread of OGBV, we need to look beyond Social Media. Before the rise of social communication websites and applications—what is known as social media today—there were other technology-facilitated communication mediums and platforms, such as Yahoo. The rise of the Internet opened doors for new and creative business ventures, ranging from social media websites and applications to online marketing and advertising (Cogency, 2020). Social media has become an essential aspect of daily life, fostering connections among people, enhancing public discussions, and boosting civic participation by enabling communication (Pros and Cons of Social Media | Brown University Health, n.d.). Its worldwide and transnational characteristics facilitate cultural interactions and encourage collaborative political and social dialogue across borders (Pros and Cons of Social Media, 2022).
Outline and Methodology:
This article investigates how the use of Islamic misinterpretations may contribute to the justification and normalization of OGBV in Sudan. It explores the intersection of OGBV and Sudanese culture, examining how social media facilitates the spread of misogyny that disproportionately impacts women in civic spaces.
Sudanese culture is deeply rooted in religion, language, and ethnicity. These elements significantly influence both mainstream culture and the Sharia-based legal structures of the country. Thus, this article investigates how these pillars shape the language of OGBV in Sudan. By analyzing social media posts and comments, the article explores the terminology used to discuss and perpetuate OGBV, tracing the roots of these terms in both Islamic contexts and Sudanese slang. This analysis reveals how the meanings and impact of these terms have evolved, providing valuable insights into the complex interplay between culture and OGBV in Sudan.
A Tapestry of Ethnicities and Languages:
Sudan is home to 500 distinct ethnic groups, according to the 1956 population census in Sudan conducted by the British Administration; 39% of the population claimed Arab ancestry, while 55% said they were of African descent; this was, of course, before the succession of South Sudan in 2011 (Poggo, 2009). However, 25% out of the 55% who claimed African descent were from Northern Sudan, now known as the Republic of Sudan (Poggo, 2009). This also means that the majority of the population in the North is of Arab descent (Poggo, 2009). Islam and ethnicity aren’t the only identifying factors here, one must also look at language.
Language is, first of all, the medium that facilitates communication between people. In addition, it serves as an identifier of identity (Role of Language in Shaping Cultural Identity, n.d.). Both language and religion are contributors to the construction of shared narratives that define cultural identity.(Celebrating Culture, Identity and Diversity for Social Cohesion, Unity and Peace in South Sudan | UNESCO, n.d.).
Islam and the State: Sharia Law Shaped Sudanese Society:
Sudan’s religious landscape has evolved significantly over time. While today, Muslims constitute the vast majority of the population (approximately 92% according to 2022 US government estimates) (US Government, n.d.). This wasn’t always the case. Prior to the 7th century, Sudan boasted a diverse religious landscape, including the Nubian kingdoms, which had fallen by the 6th century BC (Sudan – Islam, Christianity, Animism | Britannica, n.d.). Islam began to spread in Sudan through military conquest in the 7th century, gradually becoming the dominant religion. Most Sudanese Muslims today identify as Sunni and adhere to the Maliki School (Religious Beliefs In Sudan, 2017).
Although Sudan has been considered an Islamic majority country for decades, Islamic rulings did not become a “problem” until they were adopted by the state in 1983 (Maddison, A. 2003). The Sharia Laws implemented by former President Jaffar Numairy, publicly known as the September laws, marked a huge shift in Sudan’s social and legal landscape (Maddison, A. 2003). The Islamization of public life in Sudan was exacerbated by the rise of Islamists into power after the Inqaz coup of 1989, bringing the National Congress Party (NCP) to power represented by former president Omer El-Bashir, who ruled Sudan for almost three decades and was toppled by another coup that was facilitated by a popular uprising in 2018 (Bolatito, 2019). The NCP itself is a by-product of the National Islamic Front NIF that was founded by the late scholar and thinker Dr. Hassan Elturabi (Berridge, 2017), although the rise of the Islamic movement to power in Sudan didn’t happen according to the plan and vision of Elturabi; however, it sought to fundamentally change the Sudanese legal and social landscape in the country (Fluehr-Lobban & Lobban, 2001).
This era marked the rise of regulations and laws such as public order law under the umbrella of Sharia, formerly known as the Khartoum State Public Order Act (KSPOA), which was ratified in October 1996 and contains 26 articles that mainly discuss prohibited attitudes and behaviors and restrict people’s freedoms (Doebbler, 2001), specifically women. Other restrictive laws include Public Order Laws under the 1991 Criminal Law; one of the many critiques that have been repeatedly pointed at this law is its vagueness and ambiguity, women can be arrested for reasons such as “inappropriate dress,” that is left to be decided by the executive authority, and the police. Other reasons include being in mixed groups, illegal seclusion in private spaces like homes, or public like cafes or cars (Doebbler, 2001).
These laws largely impacted women in Sudan, from their social status and personal freedoms to legal rights (Warburg, 1990). This can be particularly observed in the Personal Status Law, which sets the foundation for matters of marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance, and inheritance (al-Nagar & Tønnessen, 2018). These laws do not give women enough autonomy (Wormald, 2013). When asked about the age of marriage for girls in Sudan a Judge in the Sudan Judiciary Authority who preferred anonimaty shared the following statement “With regard to the issue of child marriage, the Personal Status Law does not delineate a specific age for marriage but rather associates the capacity to marry with the concept of “maturity,” which has engendered a degree of ambiguity regarding the age of maturity. Is it 18, or something else? Why should we not interpret the provisions of the Personal Status Law in conjunction with other relevant legislation and judicial practices? For example, the Penal Code and the Civil Transactions Law both define the age of maturity as 18. Furthermore, judicial practice has consistently dictated that marriage for individuals under the age of 18 is generally not permitted, except in cases where a compelling interest is found by the court. Moreover, the law grants a girl who married prior to reaching puberty, without judicial consent, the right to annul the marriage contract. In sum, the Personal Status Law contains numerous ambiguities, and several of its provisions have become outdated. These provisions must be reformed to align with contemporary developments and societal progress.” This confirms that the law contains many ambiguities and vagueness, however stating that it is a standard practice for judges not to allow a marriage contract for a girl younger than 18, he also mentioned that there’s actually great debate on whether a girl is considered of age after completing her 18th year or once she turns 18.
Influence of Islam on Socio-cultural gender norms in Sudan
Based on the three pillars that we looked at, we can conclude that Sudan is an Arabic-speaking Muslim country with a majority of “Arabs.” Although the “Arab” ethnic dimension could be argued, for the sake of this study, we are taking the identifiers as axioms. These three cultural identifiers, religion, language, and ethnicity, are going to be our cornerstone in determining the mainstream socio-cultural norms in Sudan and its roots and connection to Islamic heritage.
The specific gender norms are mainly patriarchal and rooted in the concepts of honor (Sharaf) and shame (aib). These norms enforce certain social structures that promote men’s superiority with concepts such as Obaidance (Ta’a) and guardianship (Wilaya), where women are expected to be obedient to the male figure in her life, be it a father, a husband, or it can even be a younger brother. There is a lot of misunderstanding and misinterpretations of Islamic terms and rulings (Islam; a feminist religion?, 2023). Wilaya and Ta’a are two of the most significant concepts in Islam that often trigger conversations about gender norms and roles and their intersection with Islam and faith. Within the framework of Islamic teachings, Ta’a signifies the principle of obedience, primarily within familial and social contexts. This concept finds its roots in numerous Quranic verses and hadiths that emphasize the importance of adhering to authority figures. While often interpreted as emphasizing male authority, particularly within the marital domain, a nuanced understanding reveals a more intricate framework encompassing mutual responsibilities and rights inherent in marital relationships (Lim, 2013).
Within Islamic jurisprudence, Wilaya signifies guardianship or authority, often ascribed to men, particularly within familial contexts. This concept is frequently justified by interpretations of Surah An-Nisa (4:34), which designates men as ‘qawwamun’ (protectors and maintainers) of women. Historical interpretations of this verse have often been employed to support a hierarchical framework within the family, positioning men as superior to women based on their perceived role as providers (Islam and Patriarchy, n.d.).
Unsafe Clicks: Cyber Laws and the Perils of Online Violence in Sudan
Social media does come with its risks and challenges, although hate speech, deceiving information, and bullying are problems that superexceed the internet and social media platforms themselves, social media provide a conducive environment for individuals to say whatever they want whenever they want with minimal to not existing laws and regulations that can govern the relationship between the different individuals in these platforms (Kvalnes, 2020). Many countries around the world lack regulations curbing harmful attitudes on social media platforms, which can be attributed to the rapid change and development of these technologies (Murphy, 2024). Most of the responses to the increasing voices that advocate social media moderation are from the US, EU, and other global north countries (Murphy, 2024).
Sudan has had an existing cybercrime law since 2007 under the name Computer Crime Act of 2007. It was rebelled in 2018 by the Law Combating Cyber Crimes, amended in 2020 by the Prime Minister, Dr. Abdallah Hamdook. There is limited information available on the law because since it was first ratified by the President, then Omer El-Bashier, the law was not shared with the public over the Government’s Gazette (Sudan – Octopus Cybercrime Community – Www.Coe.Int, n.d.) (Cybercrime-Law-Sudan-Covid-Project-Final.Pdf, n.d.).
The 2020 cybercrime law’s lack of specific articles and regulations to address online gender-based violence leaves marginalized groups, particularly women and minorities, disproportionately vulnerable to abuse and harassment in digital spaces. Instead of protecting vulnerable groups, the law includes articles that echo the restrictive nature of public order laws. Some criticism directed at the 2020 cybercrime law is that it aims to monitor and surveil the public’s digital activity, shrinking public spaces and failing to comply with international freedom of expression standards. This drives a very important question: What is the difference between harm and opinions?
In the next sections, I will be focusing on Online Gender-Based Violence (OGBV). Specifically, the language that is used to harass or insult women online and its cultural references are rooted in Islamic heritage.
(Mis)Interpreting Islam: Gendered Violence in Sudanese Cyberspace
Religion provides a set of beliefs and values that identify the social norms within a society, this includes what’s considered normal, acceptable, abnormal, and unacceptable. The adaptation of religion and its infusion and cohesion with already existing cultural norms and social structures results in a social code of conduct and contract that includes the customs, habits, norms, and social behaviors that collectively shape the socio-cultural identity of a society. Sudan’s socio-cultural identity is highly identified with and influenced by its Arabic and Islamic cultural heritage. As explored above, the Islamic laws shifted the dynamics within the society, it reinforced gender norms that framed women as third-class citizens and stripped them of their agency and autonomy, this new reality extended to the digital space.
Restricting women’s access to the internet, a practice rooted in patriarchal cultural norms further widens the existing gender digital divide in Sudan. (Breaking Barriers: Examining the Digital Exclusion of Women and Online Gender-Based Violence in Sudan | Feminist Internet Research Network, n.d.). Internet penetration in Sudan stands at 16.2%, with only 11.0% of women accessing the internet compared to 16.9% of men. This gender disparity exacerbates existing inequalities and hinders women’s participation in the digital economy and access to information (Tech-Based Interventions Adress Harmful Practices,2023). Furthermore, women with internet access in Sudan can also face significant risks of domestic violence or risks online due to systemic barriers that prevent them from effectively reporting abuse, especially technology itself, which can be weaponized by abusers to facilitate extreme acts of violence. (Breaking Barriers: Examining the Digital Exclusion of Women and Online Gender-Based Violence in Sudan, 2023).
Based on existing research, 16% to 58% of females worldwide experience OGBV (Global Evidence on the Prevalence and Impact of OGBV, n.d.). Observation of OGBV in the Sudanese platform shows that the targeting of women is usually influenced by the socio-cultural gender norms that have Islamic roots, women who do not abide by these norms are more targeted and vulnerable to different abuses. This includes modesty and freedom of speech. In these cases, women are usually called loose “Matloga” or do not have a guardian, “ma endaha wali.” Other terms like Saloka, Saya’a, and Hamla are used to indicate that a woman lacks a male figure who can rule over/control her. Moreover, such terms were used in association with phrases like Adimat Alwali, a woman who lacks a guardian, or its different variations, along with Matloga. These terms mainly mean that these females are without male guardians and thus are behaving in such an “unacceptable” and “inappropriate” manner. Such terms are also largely used against the media personas.
The Evolution of OGBV in the Context of the Sudanese War:
After the eruption of the war in Sudan on April 15, 2023, the digital spaces became highly polarised, reinforcing not only ethnic but also political divisions across the lines of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and other political forces (Assal, 2023.). Phrases such as (Qahati, Qahatiya) for pro Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), and (Um-Quroon) translated into a horned Woman, describe pro-RSF women. The FFC is currently reorganized into the Coordination Body of the Democratic and Civil Forces (Taqaddum). Civil democratic forces formed this coalition to lead negotiations to stop the war, the coalition has a wide participation base (What is Next, Taqaddum, 2024.), and the leaders of the coalition have been constantly attacked and critiqued by SAF leaders, associating their affiliation with the RSF (Dame Rosalind Marsden, 2024), which has been accused of committing genocide, among many other atrocities (Human RightsWatch, 2024). On the other hand, the Sudanese Armed Forces also have its political alliances, mainly with the Islamists (Areej Elhaj, 2024), in addition to individuals and political parties and forces that publicly and explicitly support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), having the term that describes them online as (Balabsa, Balbooseen) descriptor word for (Bal Bes) which can roughly translate to pro-fighting.
This polarization has resulted in new vocabulary that also carries new annotations and meanings, as mentioned above, Qahati/Qahatiya is used as a label to describe people who are either part of FFC or Tagadom, Balbusi/Balbusiya is used as a label or describe individuals who are supporting the SAF; these phrases are usually used in conjunction with labels related to guardianship “wilaya”, such as Um-Quroon Adimat Alwali. As part of the monitoring project, I have run these words in their different variations through X’s advanced search, and the trend that was observed in these terms was largely used against feminist activists, political activists, or women who shared opinions on political and social issues.
A Sudanese feminist and political activist frequently encounters online harassment like here and here when expressing her political and feminist views. This harassment often manifests as misogynistic slurs, such as ‘matloga,’ a term frequently used and reinforced by male commentators in response to her statements and tweets. This pattern of online abuse escalated during her appearance on the DW show ‘Shabab Talk,’ where she challenged the views of an elderly sheikh, resulting in a targeted campaign of online harassment.
It has also been observed that such terms are also used against female politicians by individuals [males] who seem to not agree with the political agenda of the female politician, which is what is seen in the case of a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Vice President of the National Umma Party. The attacks directed towards this political leader use words like Ademat Alwali and Um-Quroon.
We notice that many attempts to target women in digital spaces use vocabulary that can be directly linked to Islamic laws and rulings [Sharia]. This can be largely associated with the gradual and systematic Islamization of the Sudanese social and legal landscape since 1983. However, Islamic terminology doesn’t necessarily mean that these are the religious stances on the different behaviors, thoughts, and attitudes these females exhibit. It can be considered a misinterpretation and utilization of Islamic ideology to enforce patriarchal structures and rulings.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article has examined the Islamic influence on socio-cultural gender norms in Sudan and how they manifest in Online Gender-Based Violence (OGBV). It has shown that social media can be a breeding ground for OGBV and that Sudanese women who do not conform to traditional gender norms are particularly vulnerable, the article identified the mainstream socio-cultural gender norms in Sudan based on three pillars: religion [Islam], language and ethnicity arriving at the conclusion that the mainstream culture in Sudan is an Arabic/Islamic one.
Lastly, I call for more research on the topic of OGBV in Sudan; many phenomena require studying, and this effort can start by establishing a lexicon for terms used against women in digital spaces and their explanations. Further research could explore the following questions:
What is the impact of OGBV on Sudanese women?
What can be done to prevent OGBV in Sudan?
What role can social media companies play in preventing OGBV?